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is uncontradicted there has never been such an unreasonable 
lapse of time as will cause the presumption to arise. 
[9] "Respondent husband contends that such a doctrine 
will forever bar him from securing a divorce because of his mis-
deeds of 1924. That may be true. The doctrine of recrimi-
nation is based on the concept that he who seeks redress for 
the violation of a contract resting upon mutual and dependent 
covenants must himself have performed the obligations on his 
part. (9 Cal. Jur., p. 689, sec. 58.) It is part of the general 
equity doctrine that he who comes into equity must come 
with clean hands. The legislature has seen fit to make the 
doctrine an integral part of the law of this state. It is not 
for the courts to determine the rightness or wrongness of 
the doctrine so declared. That is a legislative and not a judi-
cial 'function. 
"While it is true, as already pointed out in this opinion, 
that under some limited circumstances a husband may secure 
a divorce for acts occurring after his wife has secured a sepa-
rate maintenance decree, those circumstances do not exist in 
the instant case. In Cardinale v. Oardinale, 8 Cal. (2d) 762 
[68 Pac. (2d) 351], there was evidence from which the trial 
court could reasonably infer not only a condonation, but also 
that the parties had actually resumed marital relations after 
the wife secured the separate maintenance decree. In every 
case cited by respondent there was either direct evidence or 
evidence from which an inference could be drawn that, after 
the wife secured her decree, there was either a reconciliation 
or a bona fide attempt to effect one. There is no such evi-
dence in the instant case. Under such circumstances it must 
be held that, as a matter of law, the appellant has established 
a recriminatory defense." ... 
In view of this conclusion we do not find it necessary, not 
would it serve any useful purpose, to review the sufficiency 
of the evidence in respect to cruelty found to have been in-
flicted by the wife. , 
The judgment appealed from is reversed. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15, 
1941. 
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CLARENCE G. FRY, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
et aI., Appellants. 
WALLACE B. BEEBE, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRAN-
CISCO etal., Appellants. 
[1] Schools~Teachers-Oontracts of Employment and Oompensa.-
tion-Salaries-Rules and Resolutions.-Rules and regulations 
of school boards pertaining to teachers' salaries are governed 
by the principle of uniformity of treatment as to salary for 
those performing like services with like experience; but the 
making of reasonable classifications is not prevented. 
[2] Id.-Teachers-Oontracts of Employment and Oompensa.tion 
-Salaries ~ Salary Ratings-Incoming Teachers.-A school 
board has authority to adopt a resolution that no o,utside ex-
perience will be credited in fixing salary ratings for incoming 
teachers, where such resolution applies to all incoming 
teachers. 
[3] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of Employment and Compensation-
Salaries-Rules and Resolutions-Applicatioil to Teachers Ab-
sent on Leave.-A school board resolution that in fixing salary 
ratings for incoming teachers "outside experience will not be 
credited," does not apply to teachers who had been em-
ployed but were at the time of its adoption absent on leave. 
[4] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of Employment and Compensation-
Salaries-Rules and Resolutions-Explanatory Olause.-In a 
school board resolution against crediting outside experience in 
setting salary ratings for "incoming teachers", an explanatory 
clause that it applies also to persons on eligible lists not 
appointed to positions to date, shows that the resolution was 
not intended to apply to teachers who had been employed 
and assigned to schools but were absent on leave. 
[5] Id. ~ Teachers - General Considerations-Status.-A teacher 
employed but on leave of absence is nevertheless an employee 
of the board. 
L See 23 CaI. Jur. 126. 
McK. Dig. References: 1-4. Schools, § 92; 5. SchoolS, § 81; 6. 
Schools, § 88j 7. Schools, § 92j 8. Equity, § 37 (3) j 9. Mandamus, 
§74. 
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[6] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of :employment and Oompensation-
In General-Where Contract Found.-The terms of a contrMt 
employing a teacher are to be found in the authority granted 
the school board by law, the contract being contained in the 
statutes,the rules and regulations of the board, the resolution 
appointing the teMher, and the r~solutions of the board. 
[7] Id.-Teachers-Contracts of Employment and Oompensation':"'" 
Salaries-Acceptance of Lower Rating.-A teacher's right to 
a· particular salary rating is not affected by his acceptance of 
a lower rating in accordance with an erroneous interpretation 
of a resolution of the school board by a director of per-
sonnel. 
[8] Equity-Laches-Nature and Elements-Prejudice.-Lapse. of 
time short of the period provided by the statute of limitations 
will not bar an action unless prejudic\'l to the defendant re~ 
suIted. Whether a party acted seasonably, and whether the 
opposite party was prejudiced by the delay are questions of 
fact. 
[9] Mandamus---'-Defenses-Statute of Limitations.-In a manda-
mus proceeding by' a teacher to obtain a reciassification of 
teachers at a higher salary rating and to compel payment of 
back salary at the higher rate, an award of back salary for a 
period of. three years. prior to the action is for the minimum 
period that the court could have awarded. 
APPEAL from judgments of the ,Superior Court of the 
City' and County of San Francisco .. ' C~ J. Goodell, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
John J. O'Toole, City Attorney, Walter A. Dold, Chief 
Deputy City Attorney, and Irving G. Breyer for Appellants. 
Daniel R. Shoemaker for Respondent. 
THE CO~T.-A petition, for 'hearing in this case was 
granted to the end that further consideration be given to 
the contentions of the appellants. On such consideration, 
we agree with the disposition of the appeal by the District 
Court of Appeal of the First Appellate District, Division 
One, and adopt as the opinion of this court the opinion of 
that court. prepared by Presiding Justice Peters. It is as 
follows: 
"The defendants, the Board of Education and its mem-
~ers, and the Superintendent of Schools of the City and 
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County of San Francisco, appeal from jud~ents of the trial 
court in two mandamus proceedings ordering, defendants to 
classify and rate the two plaintiffs, both high school teachers, 
at a rating and salary in excess of that granted them by 
defendants, and awarding both plaintiffs back salary for a ; 
designated period at the higher rating. The two cases were 
tried together, and have been consolidated on appeal. 
"The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs Fry and Beebe 
were appointed high school teachers in the San Francisco 
school department on November 3, 1931, and January4, 1932, 
respectively, each being given at that time, in accordance with 
the then existing rules and regulations of the school depart-
ment, an advanced rating predicated upon previous teaching 
experience outside the City and County of San Francisco. 
Not only were plaintiffs so appointed and rated, but, at 
that time, they were assigned to particularly designated 
schools. At the time of their appointment, at their request, 
they were granted leaves of absence to the end of that school 
year-June of 1932. The salary schedule then applicable to 
plaintiffs was one that had been duly adopted by the Board of 
, Education, and which is still in' effect. This salary schedule 
provides for an increase of salary, dependent upon years of 
service. 'After the leaves of absence were granted, substitutes 
were appOinted to teach in the place of plaintiffs for the 
balance of that school year. 
"While plaintiffs were on their respective leaves ofab-
sence, but while they were in the employ of defendants, the 
Board,on February 16, 1932, adopted the following resolu-
tion: 
" 'RESOLVED: That the Personnel Department be and is ' 
hereby advised that it is the policy of the Board of Educa-
tion, at present, that in setting salary ratings for incoming 
teachers, no outside eiperiencewill be crl;ldited. (This regu-
lation also applies to persons on existing eligible lists not 
appointed to positions in the San Francisco Public Schools to 
date.) , 
"On February 24, 1932, the plaintiffs were informed by 
letter from the Assistant Director of Personnel of the school 
department, Mr. IrvIng W. Snow, that the resolution had been 
passed, and that it applied to them, and asking the .plain-
tiffs whether they wanted an assignment on· those terms. 
Both plaintiffs replied that they would accept employment 
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at the reduced salary,but expressed the hope there would be 
an adjustment. . 
(i On May 4, 1932, both plaintiffs were notified in writing 
that, effective at the end of that school year, they were dis-
charged from the school department, and they were notified 
that they would be pla<led on the eligible list. On August 9, 
1933, effective on the 14th of that month,bothplainti:/Is were 
again appointed to positions in the school department with-
out credit for their. outside experience. 
"At the time that plaintiffs were first appointed in 1931, 
four other teachers were also appointed and assigned to 
positions in the school department. These four teachers, like 
Fry and Beebe, had no teaching experience in San Francisco, 
but, like them, were given an advanced rating for outside 
teaching. experience. Unlike Fry and Beebe theSe four 
teachers did not take leaves of absence but taught from the 
date of their respective appointments until June 30, 1932. 
These four teachers, just as were plaintiffs, were dismissed 
in May of 1932. They were likewise re-appointed at the 
same time as were plaintiffs. These four teachers, however, 
were not re-employed at a first year'8 salary rating as were 
plaintiffs, but were given an advanced rating predicated upon 
their outside experience. For all practical purposes theonly 
difference between these four teachers and the plaintiffs is 
that they taught in San Francisco during the period the 
plaintiffs, although appointed and assigned, were on leaves of 
absence. 
"After the appointment of these four teachers some ques-
tion arose as to whether, under the resolution of February 
16, 1932, they were entitled to the advanced rating· predi-
cated solely on outside experience. On August 29, 1934, 
the Board adopted a resolution interpreting its former reso-
lution. This so-called 'interpretation' was adopted to de-
termine whether these four teachers were legally entitled to 
advanced ratings. It stated that the resolution 'was not in-
tended to cover, and did not refer to teachers who were 
already in the Department, and who had been given a rating 
as in the case of the teachers above mentioned; but applied 
to incoming teachers'. -
"The trial court found, on competent evidence, that plain~ 
tiffs, ever since their respective re-appointments, continu~ 
ously and by diligent means, have endeavored to be restored 
April, 1941.] FRY v. BOARD OF' EDUCATION. 757 
to their original ratings and to be p+aced in the same classifica-
tion as the four teachers above-mentioned. 
(, Based on these admitted facts, the trial. court found that 
plaintiffs were entitled 'under the rules and regulations of 
respondents then in full force and effect', to be classified at _ 
the advanced rating, The .court also concluded that the 
failure of defendants to so classify plaintiffs 'was arbitrary 
and unreasonable and that said conduct violated the rule of 
uniformity'. 
"Based on these findings l the trial court ordered defend-
ants to classify plaintiffs at the advanced ratings, and gave 
judgment for plaintiffs for back salary for a period of three 
years prior to the commencement of these proceedings. 
(( Defendants discuss at some length the question as to 
whether the Board could have legally classified the plaintiffs 
differently from the four teachers who actually -taught' in the 
San Francisco schools after their first appointment. That 
is not the real issue in these cases. The real issue is whether 
the Board did so classify the plaintiffs. In other words, the 
real issue is whether, under the rules and regulations of the 
Board, the plaintiffs were entitled to an advanced rating. 
The arbitrary action of the Board, as found by the trial court, 
did not consist in classifying plaintiffs in a different group 
from the other four teachers, but in interpreting their rules, 
regulations and resolutions so as to place plaintiffs in a 
different classification. It is our conclusion that the Board 
was not justified in refusing to grant to plaintiffs an ad-
vanced rating; that under the resolution of February 16, 
1932, its interpretation of August 29, 1934, and the rules 
and regulations of the Board, plaintiffs were legally entitled 
to the advanced rating. 
"It inust he conceded that, within the limits fixed by the 
School Oode, the Board has discretionary control over· the 
salaries of teachers. (Fidler v. Board of Trustees, 112 Cal. 
App. 296 [296 Pac. 912] ; .Abrciham v.Sims, 2 Cal. (2d) 698 
[42 Pac. (2d) 1029].) [1] However, it must also be con-
ceded that the legislature had enjoined on such Boards, within 
reasonable limits, the principle of uniformity of treatment 
as to salary for those performing like services with like 
experience. This same limitation exists in the rules and regu-
lations of the appellant Board. This limitation, however, 
does not prevent the Board from making reasonable ('la.ssifica.-
!", 
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tions. There can be no doubt that the Board may reasonably 
classify between teachers with teaching experience in San 
Francisco and those with teaching experience outside. [2] 
There can be no doubt that the resolution of February 16, 
1932, was well within the power of the Board in so far as it 
provided that as to all incoming teachers no credit for out-
side experience should be granted. It might also be conceded 
that the Board could, by proper action, classify as between 
teachers employed,' but on leave ox absence, and teachers 
employed and actually teaching. 'It may be that the Board 
could have lawfully class.ified the four teachers who had 
actually taught in San Francisco prior to June of 1932, 
in one group, and could lawfully have placed the plaintiffs, 
who were similarly employed but who were on leaves of ab-
sence, in another group. But, as already pointed out, the 
point is that the Board did not do this. It is our opinion 
that, under this resolution, and the rules and regulations of 
the Board, both groups were placed in the same classification. 
Thereafter, by a purported interpretation of the resolution 
by the Assistant Director of Personnel, the Board, without 
changing its resolutions, sought to discriminate against plain-
tiffs, and arbitrarily refused to grant to plaintiffs the salary 
rating fixed for them by the rules and regulations. 
[3] "The resolution of February 16, 1932, is not ambigu-
ous on the basic question here involved. The resolution states 
that it is to apply only to 'incoming teachers', and that as 
to them, and as to them alone, 'no outside experience will 
be credited'. Then, apparently, so that no confusion would 
result, it was added in parenthesis that the regulation applies 
to persons on the eligible lists 'not appointed to positions in 
the San Francisco Public Schools to date'. Obviously, the 
plaintiffs were not 'incoming teachers', because at the time 
the resolution was passed they were in the employ of the 
Board. If they became' incoming teachers' by virtue of their 
subsequent dismissal and their later re-employment, so did 
the· four other teachers who were likewise subsequently dis-
missed and later re-employed. There is not one word in the 
resolution indicating that it was intended to apply to teachers 
who had been employed but were on leave of absence. To 
interpret the resolution as do defendants, is to write'into the 
resolution something that is not there. That this interpreta~ 
tion of the resolution is the proper one, is strengthened, i1 
not conclusively demonstrated, by three other factors! 
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[4] "1. The explanatory clause added to the resolution 
states that the resolution not only applies to 'incoming 
teachers', but also 'to persons on existing eligible lists not 
appointed to positions in the San Francisco Public Schools to 
date'. In this case the record shows, and the trial court 
found, that not only had plaintiffs been appointed, but also 
that they had been assigned to particularly designated schools 
at the time the resolution was passed. The explanatory 
clause definitely eliminates plaintiffs from the operation of 
the resolution. (5] A teacher employed but on leave of 
absence is, nevertheless, an employee of the Board. (Fair-
child v. Board of Edtwation, 107 Cal. 92 [40 Pac. 26]; Ken-
nedy v. Board of Educatian, 82 Cal. 483 [22 Pac. 1042].) 
It has been held that in determining a teacher's seniority 
rights, the relation of employer and employee continues to 
exist although the teacher is on leave of absence, and that a 
teacher on leave of absence is within the terms of a resolu- . 
tion retaining' the present staff of teachers'. (Ryan v"Burk, 
25 Cal. App.(2d) 342 [77 Pac. (2d) 224].) 
"2. After the resolution had been passed, and after pJain-
tiffs and the other four teachers had been re-employed, the 
Board, on August 29, 1934, attempted to 'interpret' the 
resolution. At that time the Board approved the interpreta-
tion of the chairman of the legal committee that the resolu-
tion 'was not intended to cover, and did not refer to teachers 
who were already in the Department, and who had been 
given a rating as in the case of the teachers above men-
tioned; but applied to incoming teachers'. The' teachers 
'above mentioned' were the four teachers who were. appointed 
at the same time as respondents. This interpretation was 
undoubtedly correct. But, in applying it, the Board dis-
criminated against plaintiffs, who, so far as the resolution 
is concerned, were placed in the same class with the four other 
teachers. 
"3. The legal adviser of the Board, in June of 1937, in a 
formal opinion to the' Board dealing with this controversy, 
gave it as his opinion that 'the facts as disclosed by the 
records conclusively show that as a matter of equity and 
justice, this teacher (Mr. Fry) has a valid claim. There 
. appears to be no authority whatsoever·for. Mr. Snow's in-
. terpretation, of the. February 16, 1932, resolution, which he 
. interpreted to mean that a· teacher who has been appointed 
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to the Department on a definite rating based on creditable 
outside experience and granted a leave of absence, was to 
come within the purview of the February 16th resolution. To 
so hold would be reading into that resolution something which 
was not mentioned. 
" 'There is no doubt that Mr. Fry was" appointed" to the 
San Francisco School Department in November, 1931; that 
the resolution of February 16, 1932, abolishing previous 
teaching experience was expressly applicable to teachers not 
as yet "appointed"; that teachers on leaves of absence were 
already in the School Department. Therefore, Mr. Fry should 
not have been reduced in his rating. . • .' These conclu-
sions of the legal adviser are sound. 
"Defendants contend that the ordinary rules of contract 
apply to a teacher, and that, since plaintiffs accepted their 
reduced rating, they are barred from now questioning its 
validity. [6] While it is true that the relation between the 
Board and a teacher is that of employer and employee, and 
that this relationship is created by contract, the terms of that 
contract are to be found in the authority granted the Board 
by law. (Martin v. Fisher, 108 Cal. App. 34 [291 Pac. 276].) 
The rules and regulations of the Board, and the resolutions of 
the Board fixing the status of teachers,are integral parts of 
that contract. The contract is contained in the statutes, the 
rules and regulations of the board, the resolutions appointing 
plaintiffs,and the resolutions of the Board. Certainly, it 
cannot be contended that the Board can fix the status of a 
teacher by its rules and regulations, and by resolution, and 
then by a letter from an employee improperly interpreting 
the resolutions, claim that the status is different from that 
fixed by the rules and regulations and by the resolution. In 
this case, when plaintiffs were first employed, they were prop-
erly given advanced ratings. It is admitted that, under the 
then existing rules and regulations, plaintiffs were lawfully 
entitled to such ratings. If we are correct in our conclu-
sion that the resolutions of February 16, 1932, and of 
August 29, 1934, did not apply to plaintiffs, then it must 
be a fact, as found by the trial court, that, under existing 
rules and regulations; plaintiffs were entitled to the advanced 
ratings. These rules and regulations constitute, and are 
part of, the contract of the parties, and under them plaintiffs 
were entitled to the advanced ratIngs. 
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[7] "The fact that Snow, the Assistant Director of Per-
sonnel, erroneously informed plaintiffs that the resolution 
of February 16, 1932, applied to them, and that plaintiffs 
stated that, if that were necessary, they would accept the 
lower ratings, cannot serve to change the terms of the con-
tracts of the parties as fixed by the rules and regUlations. 
Snow erroneously interpreted the resolution, informed plain-
tiffs of his erroneous conclusion, and on that basis the plain-
tiffs' accepted' the reduction. Their rights were fixed not by 
that correspondence but by the rules and regulations of the 
Board. 
[8] "Defendants also urge that plaintiffs' claims for 
back salary are barred by laches, and by the statute of limita-
tions. The trial court awarded plaintiffs back salary for three 
years prior to October 29, 1937, the date this proceeding was 
instituted. So far as laches is concerned, the question must 
be determined by all the facts and circumstances of each 
case. Lapse of time short of the period provided by the 
statute of limitations will not bar an action unless prejudice 
to the defendant is shown. The applicable principles are 
exhaustively considered, and the cases cited by defendants 
are distinguished, in La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6 
[276 Pac. 377J. Whether plaintiffs acted seasonably, and 
. whether defendants were prejudiced by such a delay, were 
questions of fact for the trial court. The record shows that 
prior to the commencement of these actions the matter was 
under discussion, and that it was hoped by all concerned that 
a compromise could be effected. It was after all hope of a 
compromise had failed that these actions were brought. 
[9] "It is also urged that plaintiffs' causes of action were 
barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court awarded 
plaintiffs back salary at the advanced ratings for a period of 
three years prior to the commencement of the actions, and 
held that the balance of their claim was barred. This was 
the minimum period that the court could have awarded. 
(Rosborough v. Shasta River Canal Co., 22 Cal. 556; Raymond 
v. Ohristian, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 92 [74 Pac. (2d) 536J.) " 
For the foregoing reasons the judgments appealed from 
are affirmed. 
WAYNE HEA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
25 TAYLOR ST. GR4·80!54 
SAN J:'RANOISCO 2, CAL.IF. 
